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1 
00:00:03,040 --> 00:00:09,880 
Alright, we are excited to be at the keynote address of our college of 
liberal arts research conference 
 
2 
00:00:09,880 --> 00:00:17,600 
and I want to introduce somebody near and dear, provost Tom Sudkamp 
who is going to do a few remarks. 
 
3 
00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:22,160 
And somebody has taken my little introduction so I'm going to have to 
go by memory here Tom. 
 
4 
00:00:22,160 --> 00:00:31,840 
But Tom has been -- is it you? [laughing]. That's okay, I think I had 
it. but this will be good. 
 
5 
00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:39,080 
[laughing] I was going to wing it there. So Tom Sudkamp is the provost 
and vice president for curriculum and instruction 
 
6 
00:00:39,080 --> 00:00:47,660 
and he has served here at Wright State University for 33 years as 
professor and Chair of Department of Computer Science. 
 
7 
00:00:47,660 --> 00:00:57,320 
and as well as three terms as president of the faculty senate and we 
are really pleased to have Tom here to say a few remarks at our 
research conference. 
 
8 
00:00:57,360 --> 00:01:00,860 
It's our second annual one and we're excited to be here. 
 
9 
00:01:00,860 --> 00:01:05,820 
[applause] 
 
10 
00:01:05,820 --> 00:01:11,100 
Well I am excited to be here and I thank Kristen for the invitation, 
 
11 
00:01:11,100 --> 00:01:19,620 
because this is what we do as faculty, that we want to be talking 
about, we want our students to be talking about, 
 
12 
00:01:19,620 --> 00:01:30,460 
we all want to be seeing the types of research we do, the types of 
scholarship, the working with our students as a primary objective of 
our goals here as faculty. 
 
13 
00:01:30,460 --> 00:01:35,180 
So today's conference is a wonderful opportunity for a number of 
people. 
 
14 
00:01:35,180 --> 00:01:48,520 
I looked through the list, across from multiple disciplines here, 
talking about things that interest them, that light a fire inside both 
the researcher and the students 
 
15 
00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:53,880 
and bring new and exciting things to the classroom as you bring that 
back. 
 
16 
00:01:53,880 --> 00:02:02,320 
I do regret that I wasn't here earlier, I just go here at the last 
point to hear about you know, the looking... 
 
17 
00:02:02,320 --> 00:02:13,920 
I can't even say the right words, but the looking a the Greek 
Mycenaean pottery and artifacts. 
 
18 
00:02:13,920 --> 00:02:27,420 
I'll just throw a kick-in to show how little I know about any of this: 
If you wanna watch a great TV series, The Story of England is terrific 
series on looking at artifacts and 
 
19 
00:02:27,420 --> 00:02:35,220 
tracing from the pre-Roman to the modern day. I push that because I 
like that show so much. 
 
20 
00:02:35,220 --> 00:02:41,160 
It has nothing to do with what we're talking about here today, but 
what we are talking about is all the things that you do. 
 
21 
00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:52,240 
This is as Kristen said, the second research conference, the second in 
I hope a long line of such things, because it is the heart and soul of 
a faculty member. 
 
22 
00:02:52,240 --> 00:03:00,200 
We have two key elements. One is working with our students and the 
second is love of our scholarship. 
 
23 
00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:09,980 
So I always enjoy the areas that my research is in, although I confess 
these days I spend more time with bureaucracy than research. 
 
24 
00:03:09,980 --> 00:03:18,680 
So that gives me a more exciting time to be able to hear the things 
that you're doing. That's what I'm looking forward to doing this 
afternoon. 
 
25 
00:03:18,680 --> 00:03:28,240 
I did mention that one of the key things that's important across all 
of our disciplines is getting students involved in our research. 
 
26 
00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:36,600 
When you have an opportunity to do that, it magnifies what you're 
doing. It's not just your learning, it's moving it on to the next 
generation 
 
27 
00:03:36,600 --> 00:03:41,760 
and helping develop the research skills that you have, helping them 
move forward in their careers. 
 
28 
00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:51,160 
So with that I am looking forward to today's keynote address by doctor 
Liam Anderson and I know that you are too. 
 
29 
00:03:51,160 --> 00:04:01,300 
It's a wonderful day outside, but more importantly it's a great day in 
here so please join me in welcoming Liam to the stage and I'm looking 
forward to the talk. 
 
30 
00:04:01,300 --> 00:04:06,960 
[applause] 
 
31 
00:04:06,960 --> 00:04:15,520 
But first let me say some nice things about Liam Anderson, who is the 
recipient of the CoLA Outstanding Research Award. 
 
32 
00:04:15,520 --> 00:04:30,280 
And there's a good reason for that. His research is amazing both in 
quality and range and so is his teaching, because as we all know 
research invigorates teaching and teaching invigorates research. 
 
33 
00:04:30,280 --> 00:04:45,900 
I can give you a sense of the range of Liam's work by reading the 
titles of the five, yes five, five books he's written since coming to 
the Department of Political Science at Wright State in 2000, 
 
34 
00:04:45,900 --> 00:04:51,520 
Economic Power in a Changing International System from 2000, 
 
35 
00:04:51,520 --> 00:04:58,280 
The Future of Iraq: Democracy, Dictatorship, or Division 2004. 
 
36 
00:04:58,280 --> 00:05:04,740 
An Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs 2009 -- but now in the second 
edition, 
 
37 
00:05:04,740 --> 00:05:12,040 
Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise 2009, 
 
38 
00:05:12,040 --> 00:05:19,720 
and Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems; Accommodating Diversity from 
2013. 
 
39 
00:05:19,760 --> 00:05:32,520 
Many of these works have been done with collaborators, which does not 
have the work load, but doubles the complexity of compromise as a 
number of you here know very well. 
 
40 
00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:42,620 
And that's not all he's done, add to the list roughly ten book 
chapters, ten refereed articles, and multiple other scholarly 
accomplishments. 
 
41 
00:05:42,620 --> 00:05:45,620 
He's a research machine. 
 
42 
00:05:45,620 --> 00:05:52,160 
Liam came to Wright State 2000, right after finishing his PhD at the 
University of Georgia. 
 
43 
00:05:52,160 --> 00:06:05,320 
He also has a Masters of Philosophy in International Relations from 
the University of Cambridge, the English one and a BA with honors in 
Politics  form the University of Nottingham. 
 
44 
00:06:05,320 --> 00:06:16,260 
His interest in the transformation of politics in the Middle East, 
specifically on Iraq and the Kurds, has made him a popular scholarly 
source for the media. 
 
45 
00:06:16,260 --> 00:06:23,400 
He's given interviews on Bloomberg, CNN, and for multiple radio 
stations and print outlets. 
 
46 
00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:30,400 
He was invited to speak at the United Nations International Peace 
Institute in 2012. 
 
47 
00:06:30,400 --> 00:06:45,500 
The complex issues of global politics and peace, security in a multi-
ethnic citizenry, and how to transition a state into a democracy are 
not issues for the weak of heart. 
 
48 
00:06:45,500 --> 00:06:55,960 
It is Liam's gift to be able to translate these complicated topics and 
places into something we can all understand, without sacrificing 
nuance. 
 
49 
00:06:55,960 --> 00:07:01,860 
This makes him a great teacher as well as our outstanding scholar, as 
we will see. 
 
50 
00:07:01,860 --> 00:07:10,720 
His talk is titled Autonomy as a Solution to Ethnic Problems: Some 
Insights into the Case of Iraq. Liam. 
 
51 
00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:16,380 
[applause] 
 
52 
00:07:16,380 --> 00:07:23,260 
Well I barely recognize myself from that. I really don't have anything 
to add, thank you. 
 
53 
00:07:23,260 --> 00:07:36,160 
Yeah, let me just bring up my... There's no really good reason why 
there's a picture of a puppy on the first slide there. 
 
54 
00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:45,100 
Really the only reason is like why not, right? If nothing else, puppy 
drinking cappuccino, you can't go wrong with that, right? 
 
55 
00:07:45,100 --> 00:07:54,260 
What I'm going to try and do today -- I've got about a half an hour I 
think, to give you some sense of the journey I've been on with 
research and 
 
56 
00:07:54,260 --> 00:08:02,300 
some idea of what political science is about. The political scientists 
love their jargon, so I'll try and keep that to a minimum. 
 
57 
00:08:02,300 --> 00:08:07,520 
Basically we love jargon, because it makes us sound more intelligent 
than historians. 
 
58 
00:08:07,520 --> 00:08:13,240 
Well, makes us think we sound more intelligent than historians, but... 
 
59 
00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:22,580 
Essentially I cut my teeth within the broader sphere that's sometimes 
called institutional design or constitutional engineering, 
 
60 
00:08:22,580 --> 00:08:29,000 
on electoral systems. The first past the post system you see there on 
the left, 
 
61 
00:08:29,000 --> 00:08:37,100 
that's the system they use here in the United States, it's also used 
in Britain. There are different electoral systems in play 
 
62 
00:08:37,100 --> 00:08:46,680 
and what you find is that in fact, if you change the electoral system, 
you change something quite fundamental about the political system in 
predictable ways. 
 
63 
00:08:46,680 --> 00:08:53,400 
So in other words, the field of constitutional engineering or 
institutional design is about how you use political institutions 
 
64 
00:08:53,400 --> 00:09:04,600 
to structure the incentives for political actors, be they voters, 
political leaders, candidates for election, in such a way that you can 
predict... the outcomes become predictable. 
 
65 
00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:13,900 
Not in a sort of really hardcore scientific way, but within reason. 
For example, I've got my little pointer here and I... 
 
66 
00:09:13,900 --> 00:09:22,920 
[inaudible] and essentially that's what the system they have here. You 
just choose the candidate you want, he represents a party, and the guy 
with the most votes wins. 
 
67 
00:09:22,920 --> 00:09:31,360 
What provides is incentives in fact, for smaller groupings political 
interest to amalgamate into larger groups, because it's a winner-take-
all process. 
 
68 
00:09:31,360 --> 00:09:37,180 
So typically what you end up with is a two party system. That in turn 
has implications. 
 
69 
00:09:37,180 --> 00:09:46,420 
In a two party system, politics tends to be a kind of zero sum game, 
because if the other side wins it means you don't win, it means you 
lose. 
 
70 
00:09:46,420 --> 00:09:53,380 
If you go for a proportional representation system, the incentive 
structures are different for voters and political actors 
 
71 
00:09:53,380 --> 00:10:01,920 
and you tend to end up with a multi-party system. That in turn tends 
to produce more consensual politics, compromise, this sort of thing. 
 
72 
00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:12,640 
Trust me, I'm not necessarily a fan of proportional representation, 
but these are the kind of fairly predictable outcomes from this. 
 
73 
00:10:12,640 --> 00:10:22,080 
I wrote my Phd dissertation on this stuff, looking at how changing 
electoral systems effects things like macro-economic outcomes and so 
on and so forth. 
 
74 
00:10:22,080 --> 00:10:28,340 
And I guess it all got a little bit, I don't know, sort of First World 
problem 
 
75 
00:10:28,340 --> 00:10:38,780 
when I was writing on paper on the fact that moving to PR would 
increase inflation rates by 1.5% and decrease unemployment by.. and 
this sort of stuff. 
 
76 
00:10:38,780 --> 00:10:48,380 
I guess at that point I thought, well probably there may be a more 
pressing need for application for this sort of knowledge than the 
developed world. 
 
77 
00:10:48,380 --> 00:10:56,080 
The alternative vote is an interesting electoral system, because you 
can see from it there, you actually express preferences at the ballot 
box. 
 
78 
00:10:56,080 --> 00:11:04,280 
You choose your first guy, Jay Doe gets the first vote, Jones gets the 
second, Carter third, so on and so forth. 
 
79 
00:11:04,280 --> 00:11:14,520 
They way this system works is if my first preference votes, so if Doe 
gets eliminated, so when the votes are counted according to first 
preferences, 
 
80 
00:11:14,520 --> 00:11:22,440 
the one with the fewest first preferences gets eliminated, my vote 
then counts against my second preference. So it transfers 
 
81 
00:11:22,440 --> 00:11:26,800 
if Doe is eliminated, my vote then counts for Jones and so on and so 
forth. 
 
82 
00:11:26,800 --> 00:11:36,360 
And on of the arguments is that in ethnically divided societies for 
example, this is a good electoral system to have, because it tends to 
produce moderate political candidates. 
 
83 
00:11:36,360 --> 00:11:44,100 
Candidates gain nothing out of demonizing ethnic minorities, because 
they may need second preference votes of ethnic minorities. 
 
84 
00:11:44,100 --> 00:11:50,760 
And so, they have an incentive to put forth a moderate platform on 
ethnic issues and so on and so forth. 
 
85 
00:11:50,760 --> 00:11:58,300 
So the argument would be that AV's a good electoral system to have 
when you're coming out of an ethnic civil war, something like that. 
 
86 
00:11:58,300 --> 00:12:05,580 
So that was really what I've been working on for the last ten years or 
so. 
 
87 
00:12:05,580 --> 00:12:14,020 
Along side that, I've done quite a lot of work on Iraq. How I got 
involved in this is a long story and too long to bore you all with, 
but... 
 
88 
00:12:14,020 --> 00:12:21,900 
And here's a basic ethno-sectarian map of Iraq. It's a kind of obscene 
simplification, but it gets the point across. 
 
89 
00:12:21,900 --> 00:12:29,560 
Iraq is kind of a divided place. In the Southern parts where it's the 
dark green, that's mainly Shia Arabs live down there. 
 
90 
00:12:29,560 --> 00:12:36,760 
They are a majority of the population, about 65%. The orange on the 
left of the screen there is 
 
91 
00:12:36,760 --> 00:12:42,120 
mainly Sunni Arab areas and the brown in the North are Kurds. 
 
92 
00:12:42,120 --> 00:12:49,280 
So Sunnis are probably 20% of the population, Kurds somewhere between 
15-20%. There's also other groups: 
 
93 
00:12:49,280 --> 00:12:55,740 
Turkmens, Christians, Yazidis, all manor of other groups. It's kind of 
a complicated place. 
 
94 
00:12:55,740 --> 00:13:03,840 
But the reason I in a sense, got interested in Iraq was in the build 
up to the war in 2003. 
 
95 
00:13:03,840 --> 00:13:12,080 
One of the issues that I addressed in this book was... my colleague by 
the way, who should take some of the credit, he's the one who had all 
the connections in Iraq, 
 
96 
00:13:12,080 --> 00:13:18,620 
so he got us interviews with the Kurdish leaders and so on. But one of 
the issues I was interested in was.. Okay... 
 
97 
00:13:18,620 --> 00:13:25,340 
If you go into Iraq and you get rid of basically the Sunni Arab regime 
and you bring in democracy 
 
98 
00:13:25,340 --> 00:13:33,640 
and if it's by straight majority vote, what you're going to end up 
doing is inverting the power structure that's been in place since the 
1920's. 
 
99 
00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:42,700 
Then you have to think about how you're going to accommodate the Kurds 
and what their demands are. Do you need to have some sort of elaborate 
power sharing mechanisms at the center? 
 
100 
00:13:42,700 --> 00:13:47,560 
Do you need the Kurds to have their own autonomous region and various 
other things? 
 
101 
00:13:47,560 --> 00:13:58,540 
And so the issue of ethnic autonomy and ethnic federalism and this 
sort of stuff, I sort of became interested in that from looking at the 
case of Iraq. 
 
102 
00:13:58,540 --> 00:14:05,380 
You can see on the right hand side of the screen there, basically a 
unitary system, central government has all the power. 
 
103 
00:14:05,380 --> 00:14:12,140 
It can choose to give power to regions or states or whatever sub-level 
units, but it can also just take it away. 
 
104 
00:14:12,140 --> 00:14:21,600 
The central government possess all the power. In a federal system 
power is constitutionally divided between the center and the states. 
 
105 
00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:28,840 
So in the U.S. system. Article 1, Section... help me out... 6 
[laughing] 
 
106 
00:14:28,840 --> 00:14:38,720 
gives all the powers of the federal government and the 10th Amendment 
of the Constitution says if the federal government doesn't have it, 
according to the constitution,  the states have it. 
 
107 
00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:44,040 
So the central government can't just arbitrarily remove power from the 
states. 
 
108 
00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:52,060 
So a federal system essentially gives autonomy the sub-units I guess. 
Now in the context of Iraq, 
 
109 
00:14:52,060 --> 00:15:02,700 
As I say, I really came at this from the Kurdish point of view. It was 
really obvious that if you're going to go in, you're going to have to 
deal with the Kurds at some point, because the Kurds have been 
autonomous 
 
110 
00:15:02,700 --> 00:15:11,320 
on their own, basically for ten years prior to this, under UN control 
more or less, protected by the US and the UK. They hadn't been part of 
Iraq at all. 
 
111 
00:15:11,320 --> 00:15:19,300 
If you want the Kurds to rejoin Iraq as it were, kind of the minimum 
requirement is going to be that Kurds have some autonomy, 
 
112 
00:15:19,300 --> 00:15:29,160 
but then that raises a whole number of other questions. How do allow 
the Kurds to have their autonomy guaranteed? 
 
113 
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:35,600 
Do you need say, elaborate power sharing mechanisms based on ethnicity 
at the center and so on and so forth. It all gets kind of complicated. 
 
114 
00:15:35,600 --> 00:15:47,880 
The conclusion of the book by the way, was that if we're going to do 
this, go in and remove the regime, then it's going to be complicated 
and we'd better be prepared to hang around for 50 years to do it. 
 
115 
00:15:47,880 --> 00:15:55,960 
So we really need to do a Japan or Germany on Iraq. The only drawback 
is we thought the Iraq people wouldn't be okay with that 
 
116 
00:15:55,960 --> 00:16:01,400 
and so it wasn't a very optimistic book let's say. 
 
117 
00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:09,280 
The consensus among political scientists at this time was that giving 
the Kurds an autonomous region would be a really really bad idea. 
 
118 
00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:19,320 
And there are a number of articles in quite influential journals, 
journals like Foreign Affairs and so on,  talking about what to do 
with Iraq afterwards 
 
119 
00:16:19,320 --> 00:16:28,840 
and the argument basically was: if you give the Kurds their own 
autonomous region, essentially what you do is you deepen and 
strengthen their ethnic identity. 
 
120 
00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:34,960 
You harden the ethnic divisions between the Iraqs... the Kurds and the 
Arabs inside Iraq 
 
121 
00:16:34,960 --> 00:16:45,840 
and you give them institutions, quite powerful institutions. So again, 
this is Masoud Barzani is the President of Kurdistan. 
 
122 
00:16:45,840 --> 00:16:59,160 
There he is,, Masoud. This is the Kurdish Army. Kurd actually have 
kind of two armies, but the Peshmerga, they're very capable armed 
forced. They're they guys we are now basically funding weapons and 
things to to fight ISIS. 
 
123 
00:16:59,160 --> 00:17:07,940 
They're the ones that actually fought ISIS rather than run away. 
Kurdish Parliament there and Kurdish flag. So essentially you invest 
the Kurds with 
 
124 
00:17:07,940 --> 00:17:17,580 
a sense of their separateness from the rest of Iraq and in the end 
what you're doing is paving the way for the Kurds to leave Iraq, to 
secede from Iraq. 
 
125 
00:17:17,580 --> 00:17:26,540 
So it's a really really bad idea to give them autonomy. That was 
conventional wisdom. The broader argument here is against the whole 
idea of ethnic autonomy 
 
126 
00:17:26,540 --> 00:17:33,140 
and again, this is I would say the bulk of the literature in political 
science says this is not a good idea. 
 
127 
00:17:33,140 --> 00:17:41,940 
The broader argument is about the balance between the center and 
ethnic regions as it were and how difficult it is to maintain that 
balance, 
 
128 
00:17:41,940 --> 00:17:51,180 
because all the issues that arise naturally in a federal system 
between the center and the periphery, things like education. 
 
129 
00:17:51,180 --> 00:17:58,820 
In an ethnic environment where you have an ethnic autonomous region, 
the contents of textbooks matter a whole lot; how you tell history in 
your schools. 
 
130 
00:17:58,820 --> 00:18:06,340 
Things like that. All of these issues can be resolved where there are 
no ethnic divisions become magnified when you have ethnic autonomy 
 
131 
00:18:06,340 --> 00:18:11,320 
So it's preserving a balance between the center and the units is kind 
of impossible. 
 
132 
00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:17,480 
So I guess the again, the conventional wisdom is that this ethnic 
autonomy is a bad solution. 
 
133 
00:18:17,480 --> 00:18:26,980 
It either ends up in the secession of the ethnic unit or else the 
central government, sort of re-centralizes the system and gets rid of 
the institutions of autonomy. 
 
134 
00:18:26,980 --> 00:18:33,560 
SO it fails either one way or the other. The poster child for this 
sort of failure is the Soviet Union. 
 
135 
00:18:33,560 --> 00:18:40,860 
A lot of these republics, I mean you could say some of them had a 
preexisting identity. 
 
136 
00:18:40,860 --> 00:18:49,420 
Georgia, Georgians, the population of Georgia knew what it was to be 
Georgian. The three Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
 
137 
00:18:49,420 --> 00:18:53,900 
they weren't absorbed until 1939, they had a sort of preexisting sense 
of identity. 
 
138 
00:18:53,900 --> 00:18:59,960 
But some of these other ones, I mean Kazakhstan was kind of a creation 
of the Soviet Union. 
 
139 
00:18:59,960 --> 00:19:08,340 
Basically the Soviet Union said "well there your borders... you are 
now land of the Kazakhs, go and be Kazakhs and so the Kazakhs have 
invented an identity for themselves 
 
140 
00:19:08,340 --> 00:19:14,520 
essentially and I saw recently in the news that they now have a Kazakh 
version of Game of Thrones 
 
141 
00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:21,940 
in order for them to track their own identity back to you know, a 
couple of a thousand years and things like that. 
 
142 
00:19:21,940 --> 00:19:29,100 
And so in a sense in Moldova, Maldova's Romania or essentially a chunk 
of Romania that was chopped out by the Soviets. 
 
143 
00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:35,160 
Now there is a Moldovan Identity. So in a sense, the Soviet Union 
created these identities 
 
144 
00:19:35,160 --> 00:19:45,700 
and of course come 199, turns out that not all of these guys want to 
remain part of the Soviet Union and it falls apart along its lines of 
its ethnic units. 
 
145 
00:19:45,700 --> 00:19:57,840 
Another good example is Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's six republics: 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Bosnia. 
 
146 
00:19:57,840 --> 00:20:05,900 
And again, the idea essentially is you organize the system around 
ethnic autonomy, 
 
147 
00:20:05,900 --> 00:20:14,060 
ultimately you reinforce ethnic identities and you make the emergence 
of some sort of transcendence Yugoslav identity, all but impossible. 
 
148 
00:20:14,060 --> 00:20:25,560 
In fact the Yugoslavs used to keep track of this on a census. They 
used to ask the question: what's your primary source of identity? And 
the average was about 3% of the population would say Yugoslav. 
 
149 
00:20:25,560 --> 00:20:36,320 
The rest would say "I'm primarily Croat" or I'm Serb" or whatever and 
so it never succeeded in generating an overarching identity that could 
hold it all together. 
 
150 
00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:45,660 
So given that that's what the conventional wisdom among political 
scientists was, the question is well then it's still the problem what 
do you do with the Kurds, right? 
 
151 
00:20:45,660 --> 00:20:53,600 
The argument that most political scientists put forward. This was the 
preferred solution, was this idea of territorial federalism 
 
152 
00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:59,020 
where you actually draw boundary lines to chop up the ethnic group 
 
153 
00:20:59,020 --> 00:21:09,280 
and the idea here is that -- and it would have worked int he case of 
the Kurds -- you divide up the Kurds into three separate units. Then 
each unit in a sense, acquires its own sort of separate identity 
 
154 
00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:14,300 
and you kind of activate divisions within Kurdish community. 
 
155 
00:21:14,300 --> 00:21:19,720 
You prevent the emergence of this unified Kurdish entity that can then 
challenge the central government. 
 
156 
00:21:19,720 --> 00:21:26,400 
So essentially its a divide and conquer logic through the drawing of 
boundary lines of federal sub-units. 
 
157 
00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:34,520 
And in fact, on the right there is a map of -- they were the eighteen 
governorates in place in Iraq at the time the regime was overthrown. 
 
158 
00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:44,700 
So you actually wouldn't have had to do anything. You could have left 
that map in place and you would have had the three northern 
governorates there would have been overwhelming Kurdish, 
 
159 
00:21:44,700 --> 00:21:51,960 
but they would have had, they would have developed separate interests 
and so on and so forth. So that was the prefers solution of political 
scientists 
 
160 
00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:59,020 
and it's a very I think, quite intellectually pleasing solution and 
it's been shown to work in some places. 
 
161 
00:21:59,020 --> 00:22:08,180 
Nigeria is a good a example. I don't want to get too deep into this, 
but that was what Nigeria looked like when it obtained independence 
form Britain 
 
162 
00:22:08,180 --> 00:22:13,500 
in 1960. It was three units organized kind of roughly around ethnic 
groups. 
 
163 
00:22:13,500 --> 00:22:20,800 
So the Western Yoruba, the Eastern region was Igbo, Northern region 
Hausa Fulani essentially. 
 
164 
00:22:20,800 --> 00:22:33,180 
So each ethnic group got it's own region. What ended up happening was 
you could see the Northern region's much bigger than the rest. It had 
a bigger population and it basically overpowered the other two 
regions. 
 
165 
00:22:33,180 --> 00:22:40,040 
And because it was taken over by an ethnic group or captured by an 
ethnic group. This came to assume 
 
166 
00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:47,060 
the feeling that it was an ethnic sort of imposition by the Hausa 
Fulani on the Igbo and Yoruba 
 
167 
00:22:47,060 --> 00:22:55,740 
ends up civil war, the Igbo try to secede calling themselves the 
Republic of Biafra, ends up killing a million people, total disaster. 
 
168 
00:22:55,740 --> 00:23:00,760 
The solution in Nigeria was chop it up. 
 
169 
00:23:00,760 --> 00:23:09,240 
That way you -- and the argument was you can activate sub-ethnic 
divisions among the Hausa Fulani and amongst the Yoruba and the Igbo. 
 
170 
00:23:09,240 --> 00:23:15,020 
So you avoid this sort of cataclysmic collision of ethnic identities 
at the center. 
 
171 
00:23:15,020 --> 00:23:21,100 
And in fact, the Nigerians just went haywire over this stuff and they 
just kept on dividing and dividing and dividing. 
 
172 
00:23:21,100 --> 00:23:31,840 
They're now 36 different units, but you know, Nigeria in someways is 
not a raging success, but the fact that Nigeria is still together as a 
single country is in some ways... 
 
173 
00:23:31,840 --> 00:23:40,900 
most if you've read most experts on Nigeria, they say there's no way 
this could have happened unless these original boundary lines have 
been chopped up. 
 
174 
00:23:40,900 --> 00:23:45,640 
So that was kind of the idea, we do that in Iraq and everything will 
work out fine. 
 
175 
00:23:45,640 --> 00:23:52,260 
The real problem was that if you knew anything about the Kurds, the 
Kurds are never ever ever going to accept that, 
 
176 
00:23:52,260 --> 00:23:58,200 
because essentially this is a divide and conquer tactic, it's 
deliberately designed to divide them up. 
 
177 
00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:05,100 
And the Kurds were absolutely adamant "this isn't going to happen to 
us". So you then invent kind of an impasse. 
 
178 
00:24:05,100 --> 00:24:13,200 
If you listen to political scientists, political scientists will tell 
you: ethnic autonomy is a really bad idea. 
 
179 
00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:23,420 
So don't do that, instead do this, but this is not a politically 
feasible solution. It's not actually practical in the real world, 
 
180 
00:24:23,420 --> 00:24:26,900 
because the Kurds would never ever have accepted this. 
 
181 
00:24:26,900 --> 00:24:35,300 
So in the end then there's not much political science has to inform 
these poor guys on the ground who are thinking "how are we going to 
design the system?" 
 
182 
00:24:35,300 --> 00:24:43,900 
Because the solution they propose is politically unfeasible and the 
most logical solution, political scientists will tell you, doesn't 
work. 
 
183 
00:24:43,900 --> 00:24:55,460 
So okay, my thought at the time was look, we have an obligation I 
think, to be a bit more helpful and a bit more useful as political 
scientists. 
 
184 
00:24:55,460 --> 00:25:02,000 
And so one of the things that I worked on was trying to figure out in 
fact what is the current record of ethnic autonomy? 
 
185 
00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:07,780 
How many sort of ethnic federal arrangements have their been since 
1945? 
 
186 
00:25:07,780 --> 00:25:17,140 
And then even look, how many have succeeded and how many have failed? 
So how many have resulted in either secession of the ethnic unit or 
the re-centralization of the center or whatever? 
 
187 
00:25:17,140 --> 00:25:23,280 
And if you look at it, you that there's some failures certainly, 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and so on. 
 
188 
00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:28,580 
And obviously the Soviet Union is pretty substantively signification 
as a failure. 
 
189 
00:25:28,580 --> 00:25:38,800 
But there have also been quite a lot of successes. Belgium's still 
around. I mean again, it's not a model of political efficiency, but it 
hasn't suffered a succession yet. Flanders is still there. 
 
190 
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:49,600 
Canada came close in 1995, but Canada's still around. Switzerland, 
India has a federal system base don language essentially. 
 
191 
00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:58,260 
So there are a whole bunch of successes as well. And so for me as a 
political scientist what I wanted to know is what explains... 
 
192 
00:25:58,260 --> 00:26:03,460 
Is there something systematic that explains the failures rater than 
the successes? 
 
193 
00:26:03,460 --> 00:26:08,980 
Because if we can explain why some are more likely to succeed than 
others, 
 
194 
00:26:08,980 --> 00:26:14,360 
maybe we can actually help guys on the ground who actually have to 
design these systems. 
 
195 
00:26:14,360 --> 00:26:20,720 
Maybe this can be something practical that can be used you know, it 
has a real word application. 
 
196 
00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:27,800 
And so ultimately what I looked at really was the internal structure, 
how are things structured? 
 
197 
00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:37,280 
And in fact, there are three different ways to structure ethnic 
autonomy. You can do the full ethno-federation thing, which is where 
all the units are essentially ethnically defined. 
 
198 
00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:46,860 
So every single of societies major ethnic groups gets its own 
homeland, Soviet Unions another example, Czechoslovakia, so on. 
 
199 
00:26:46,860 --> 00:26:59,480 
You can also do this, which is where a smaller ethnic group gets its 
autonomous area, but the rest of the country isn't a federal system, 
it's a unitary system. 
 
200 
00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:06,020 
So Moldova's a good example of this for Gagauzia is an autonomous 
ethnic region within Moldova. 
 
201 
00:27:06,020 --> 00:27:12,140 
It's a small part of the population, it's probably 4% of the Moldovan 
population. 
 
202 
00:27:12,140 --> 00:27:25,140 
It's survived today, it's don't reasonably well. So that's a different 
way to organize it. And they way that I thought was going to be the 
most effective was the way that the Canadian system is organized. 
 
203 
00:27:25,140 --> 00:27:31,060 
This... I'm sorry about the jargon, I said no jargon and then partial 
ethno-federation. Jargon, right? 
 
204 
00:27:31,060 --> 00:27:40,040 
But the way the Canadian system is structured, you have Quebec which 
is the ethnic unit, ethnolingusitic if you want to call it that. 
 
205 
00:27:40,040 --> 00:27:50,860 
But rather than have the rest of Canada as a sort of Anglo unit -- so 
you have a federation of two units, an Anglo unit and a French 
speaking unit, 
 
206 
00:27:50,860 --> 00:27:56,620 
the Anglo Unit is chopped up, it's divided up into multiple units, 
into multiple provinces. 
 
207 
00:27:56,620 --> 00:28:04,580 
And the interesting thing about Canada is what you see over time is if 
you look there at Alberta and Saskatchewan, they're... 
 
208 
00:28:04,580 --> 00:28:08,880 
I mean they were not part of the original federation, they were 
created in 1905. 
 
209 
00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:18,260 
And since 1905 what has emerged is a distinct Albertan Identity. These 
people feel attached to the land. 
 
210 
00:28:18,260 --> 00:28:27,980 
They feel attached to so... and in Alberta now you have textbooks that 
talk about the evolution of Albertan identity and this sort of thing. 
 
211 
00:28:27,980 --> 00:28:36,000 
And arguably, the Albertans are more likely secede from the union than 
Quebec was. 
 
212 
00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:41,420 
Saskatchewan again, there's quite a strong sense of regional identity 
in Saskatchewan 
 
213 
00:28:41,420 --> 00:28:50,800 
and it's an entirely kind of created, it's socially constructed 
identity. You construct it by drawing lines on a map and saying "you 
are now in Alberta." 
 
214 
00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:56,520 
You wait fifty years and then people start to think and believe like 
Albertans. 
 
215 
00:28:56,520 --> 00:29:06,160 
What this does is it creates a system that's more balanced, because 
when you have struggles between the provinces and the central 
government. 
 
216 
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:14,060 
Quebec isn't going to be on its own. It's in alliance with other Anglo 
units like Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
 
217 
00:29:14,060 --> 00:29:21,560 
They all have a vested interest in protecting their autonomy. So it 
doesn't become ethno-fied in the same way 
 
218 
00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:29,760 
So the argument was India's like this as well, there's others, 
Switzerland's like this, Russia's like this, these are better balanced 
systems was the argument. 
 
219 
00:29:29,760 --> 00:29:38,240 
So essentially if we look at the probability of success and this is... 
I'm working on a paper right now with a colleague Dr. Koster. 
 
220 
00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:42,940 
He's my number cruncher so I'll shout out to him. 
 
221 
00:29:42,940 --> 00:29:53,640 
We argue that basically partial ethno-federations are going to have 
the highest probability of success. Ethnic federacies and full ethno-
federations are going to have a lower probability of success. 
 
222 
00:29:53,640 --> 00:30:04,440 
So you then go out and get your caseload. So there's all out cases. 
You see, these are all the ethnic units of Russia, there are 21 ethnic 
units in Russia. 
 
223 
00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:12,660 
Spain, again there are three and we counted Andalusia as a separate 
ethnic unit, but Catalonia. 
 
224 
00:30:12,660 --> 00:30:21,780 
And so some of these succeeded and some of them failed over time. So 
this is everything, all of them in the the world that there have been 
since 1945. 
 
225 
00:30:21,780 --> 00:30:26,780 
So you can code these things according to the structure of the system 
within which they operate 
 
226 
00:30:26,780 --> 00:30:33,400 
and you can code for other things that may also effect probability of 
success or failure like level of democracy. 
 
227 
00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:40,360 
The more democratic the system, the more likely it is to succeed, the 
less likely you are to get secession and so on and so forth. 
 
228 
00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:46,340 
I'm going to show you numbers, because Dr. Koster would never forgive 
me for not showing numbers. 
 
229 
00:30:46,340 --> 00:30:52,200 
But there's basically, once you've coded it you can crunch the numbers 
and this is what you get, you get 
 
230 
00:30:52,200 --> 00:31:03,920 
and let me intemperate it for you. Essentially what this tells us is 
partial ethno-federations have a higher probability of success than 
either full ethno-federations or ethnic federacies. 
 
231 
00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:11,580 
So partial ethno-federations are the way to go, essentially. But the 
interesting thing and this is thing that I found interesting, 
 
232 
00:31:11,580 --> 00:31:26,400 
is that this is -- trust me you can measure democracy though -- this 
is average democratic environment. So you go from -2 down here to 10 
is actually the maximum the you get [inaudible] 
 
233 
00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:35,160 
that at really high levels of democracy -- so you get the 10 here --- 
it actually doesn't matter which of these three structures you have, 
 
234 
00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:43,400 
because once the system become fully democratic you notice norms of 
compromise are kind of embedded and so they can normally sort 
themselves out. 
 
235 
00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:57,080 
Same thing at the bottom end here, if we extended this a little bit 
longer the lines all converge and we're back to -3. So in other words, 
in really really undemocratic environments it doesn't matter which of 
these three you chose, they're all going to fail. 
 
236 
00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:04,020 
It matters most in the middle here. So in other words, if a democratic 
environment of 2, 
 
237 
00:32:04,020 --> 00:32:20,780 
which happens to be where most of the words ethnic conflict zones are, 
you've got almost zero chance if you adopt a full ethnic federation, 
little higher if you adopt an ethnic federacie, much higher if you 
adopt a partial ethno-federation. 
 
238 
00:32:20,780 --> 00:32:29,820 
So which of these three structures you choose, the importance of it 
varies according to how democratic the system. 
 
239 
00:32:29,820 --> 00:32:39,300 
And if you think about where awe are going to inevitably have ethnic 
autonomous regions, we're going to have them in Syria if Syria 
survives it's civil war. 
 
240 
00:32:39,300 --> 00:32:48,920 
We're going to have in Ukraine without a doubt. Georgia has two bits 
of it that are separatists, they operate as kind of independent 
things. 
 
241 
00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:55,700 
If they're ever going to come back to Georgia you know, it's going to 
be as autonomous units within a Georgian state. 
 
242 
00:32:55,700 --> 00:33:06,800 
So in the context of Iraq of course, what we have now is ISIS kind of 
rampaging throughout Syria and Northern Iraq. 
 
243 
00:33:06,800 --> 00:33:14,140 
A lot of the reason why ISIS was able to take root in Iraq was because 
of the prime minister down there, Nouri al-Maliki 
 
244 
00:33:14,140 --> 00:33:27,360 
who really targeted Sunni and particularly Sunni political leaders. So 
the Sunni's were participating in the political process and al-Maliki 
started traking them down; hunting them down and weeding them out 
basically. 
 
245 
00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:35,740 
Because from... he was kind of a paranoid leader and for him they were 
all basically terrorists and you know and Al-Qaeda sympathizers and 
the what. 
 
246 
00:33:35,740 --> 00:33:46,580 
So I mean he basically issued an arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice 
President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi and sort of stage managed a 
kangaroo court to sentence him to death. 
 
247 
00:33:46,580 --> 00:33:57,040 
So al-Hashimi is I think, probably in Qatar right now. Same with the 
finance minister. So he was basically hunting down prominent Sunni 
Arab, popular Sunni Arab politicians. 
 
248 
00:33:57,040 --> 00:34:06,720 
This created a big protests in the Sunni Arab areas and that's how 
ISIS kind of got its talons into the Sunni Arab part of Iraq. 
 
249 
00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:13,560 
Once ISIS is gone the question of what we do with the Sunni Arab part 
of Iraq is going to rise once more and the question is: 
 
250 
00:34:13,560 --> 00:34:20,260 
do we need to protect Sunnis from leaders like al-Maliki? 
 
251 
00:34:20,260 --> 00:34:24,780 
There going to need probably their own autonomous area. 
 
252 
00:34:24,780 --> 00:34:39,380 
This is the most, I mean this is... Joe Biden [laughing]... I mean 
speaking intellectuals, Joe Biden, this is his favored solution and 
also several of the think tanks, they say "alright, 
 
253 
00:34:39,380 --> 00:34:48,960 
given that we've got three groups in Iraq, give them each their own 
unit so that Shiia can get there Shiiastan, Sunnis get the middle bit, 
and Kurds get the Northern bit. 
 
254 
00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:57,760 
Well we can actually calculate what the likelihood of this surviving 
is relative to other structures 
 
255 
00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:14,160 
and that essentially is calculation. If you can see there, if you 
have... Can you read it or not? The ethnic federacie, so that's the 
Kurdistan region where the rest of Iraq stays unitary, the probability 
to survive is about 13%. 
 
256 
00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:23,020 
An ethnic federacie with a Kurdish regiona and a Sunni region, you can 
see increases a little bit. The worst of all options is the Joe Biden 
option: 
 
257 
00:35:23,020 --> 00:35:29,900 
three ethnic units. That has very low probability of success and the 
best is this, 
 
258 
00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:37,560 
partial ethno-federation with a Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq, 
Shiia Iraq stays chopped up, divided up. 
 
259 
00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:48,500 
So I hashed out using paint, the paint option on something. There you 
go. So you've got.. it's very rough. 
 
260 
00:35:48,500 --> 00:35:55,800 
The Kurdish region up here, Sunni region here and you retain these 
divisions within the Shiia South. 
 
261 
00:35:55,800 --> 00:36:04,460 
And again what this will do if you know anything about the Shiia 
South, you actually know that in fact there are different 
constituencies,Shiia are not a homogeneous block. 
 
262 
00:36:04,460 --> 00:36:17,000 
Basra has a sense of itself as being a cosmopolitan open city, the 
shrine cities Karbala and Najaf are much more socially conservative, 
they're very different economic interest and this sort of thing. 
 
263 
00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:26,980 
So you retain those divisions within the Shiia block. So in a sense, 
the Shiia would be dividing and conquering themselves. 
 
264 
00:36:26,980 --> 00:36:31,760 
But in the end that's the best chance of survival for Iraq. 
 
265 
00:36:31,760 --> 00:36:40,320 
Beyond that, you know, the same thing could be said, I mean Syria, the 
Kurds have already written their constitution for a post-war Syria 
 
266 
00:36:40,320 --> 00:36:47,040 
that basically has themselves as having an autonomous region in the 
North. 
 
267 
00:36:47,040 --> 00:36:56,920 
We have a choice. I mean we can either go to war against the Kurds to 
take that territory back or wright a constitution for Syria post-war, 
I mean the let Syrians write it themselves 
 
268 
00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:05,240 
post-war, that acknowledges an autonomous Kurdish unit. The the 
question becomes how do you organize the rest of Syria? 
 
269 
00:37:05,240 --> 00:37:16,560 
So these, you know, these are sorts of questions that are going to be 
with us for a long period of time and I guess what I would try to do 
with research and particularly with Dr. Koster is 
 
270 
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:25,180 
to figure out something useful to be able to present to people rather 
than just say don't do this, it doesn't work, here's the thing that 
works. 
 
271 
00:37:25,180 --> 00:37:31,880 
Where as in fact the thing that works is of course politically 
impossible to do. So I guess that's... 
 
272 
00:37:31,880 --> 00:37:38,680 
Am I done with my time? Yes, I am. So I shall stop and take any 
questions, except for Marin Levine 
 
273 
00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:46,520 
[applause] 
 
274 
00:37:46,520 --> 00:37:52,780 
Uhh [laughing] 
 
275 
00:37:52,780 --> 00:38:11,400 
I greatly appreciate your work from the inside [inaudible] the partial 
ethno whatever you call it [inaudible] the contribution. 
 
276 
00:38:11,400 --> 00:38:21,000 
You're well aware that nation building, however you define it is hard 
work and is impossible to do. 
 
277 
00:38:21,000 --> 00:38:25,860 
It's not impossible. It's hard work, I'll concede you that. 
 
278 
00:38:25,860 --> 00:38:35,840 
Okay, whatever. What I would just suggest here is to add to your work 
and your contribution [inaudible] 
 
279 
00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:44,280 
But in the regions that have the most severe and dangerous conflict in 
recent memory, killing, 
 
280 
00:38:44,280 --> 00:39:00,760 
that that isn't enough that it's a word [inaudible] ever since we've 
kind of been unifying it. [inaudible] sort of ethno-divisions 
[ainaudible]. 
 
281 
00:39:00,760 --> 00:39:03,460 
I think majority rules is a much better view. 
 
282 
00:39:03,460 --> 00:39:10,800 
Context makes a difference. But I think it's still a matter that we 
have to start thinking of in terms of historical [inaudible] 
 
283 
00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:21,040 
In terms of majority rules isn't going to work [Inaudible] 
 
284 
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:34,900 
To restrain the government the majority [inaudible] basically 
formulating Liepot's associatioinal democracy for the divided society 
 
285 
00:39:34,900 --> 00:39:42,060 
Well except that Liepot's idea was much more to do with power sharing 
at the center. So.. Sorry? 
 
286 
00:39:42,060 --> 00:39:44,300 
His idea was to do what exactly? 
 
287 
00:39:44,300 --> 00:39:51,380 
He was much more focused on power sharing at the center so that the 
governments basically... 
 
288 
00:39:51,380 --> 00:39:59,060 
if it's Iraq you have the Kurds get one position: the president, the 
Sunni's get the vice president, the Shiia get the prime minister, 
 
289 
00:39:59,060 --> 00:40:06,480 
and all three have to agree anything, but that's much more his line 
rather than in terms of autonomy. 
 
290 
00:40:06,480 --> 00:40:10,000 
That was not really apart of what he did as it were, 
 
291 
00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:17,700 
but I guess his way of looking at the world was you use ethnic groups 
as the building blocks of the system 
 
292 
00:40:17,700 --> 00:40:29,800 
and I think what this does, if you think about Canada, that's not 
using ethnic blocks, it's allowing the French speakers in Canada to 
have an area of autonomy, 
 
293 
00:40:29,800 --> 00:40:36,980 
but it actually is chopping up the English block and relying on new 
identities emerging from that and so on and so forth. 
 
294 
00:40:36,980 --> 00:40:42,520 
So in some ways it's a theoretical contradiction to what Liepot 
believes. 
 
295 
00:40:42,520 --> 00:40:47,840 
He was a primordialist rather than a social constructivist. 
 
296 
00:40:47,840 --> 00:40:50,040 
[inaudible] 
 
297 
00:40:50,040 --> 00:40:56,140 
That's why I use him. Jargon is the last resort of the villain. 
[laughing] 
 
298 
00:40:56,140 --> 00:41:05,660 
How would you cut up the Sunni section of Iraq and how do you just cut 
of the Shiia section? I understand [inaudible] 
 
299 
00:41:05,660 --> 00:41:09,640 
If you go by the Canada model [inaudible] 
 
300 
00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:15,680 
The key thing is cutting up the largest predominant population, right? 
 
301 
00:41:15,680 --> 00:41:23,980 
So that's Hindi speakers are in India for example and not a majority 
of the population. they're about 40%. 
 
302 
00:41:23,980 --> 00:41:33,820 
But they're chopped up into multiple federal sub-units along side 
linguistically homogeneous units like Tamil Nadu and Kerala and places 
like this. 
 
303 
00:41:33,820 --> 00:41:48,180 
It's chopping up the dominant... the bit that would otherwise dominate 
the whole thing and you chop them up and you hope that there's a sort 
of... that that activates intra- or sub-ethnic divisions within the 
majority ethnic group 
 
304 
00:41:48,180 --> 00:41:54,880 
and therefore diminishes the fear on the part of the ethnic minority 
groups, that they're going to be dominated by an ethnic majority. 
 
305 
00:41:54,880 --> 00:42:00,380 
You make it more difficult for an ethnic majority or dominant ethnic 
group to dominate everybody else. 
 
306 
00:42:00,380 --> 00:42:03,960 
[inaudible] 
 
307 
00:42:03,960 --> 00:42:04,460 
Yes. 
 
308 
00:42:04,460 --> 00:42:07,540 
[inaudible] 
 
309 
00:42:07,540 --> 00:42:08,040 
Yes. 
 
310 
00:42:08,040 --> 00:42:10,040 
[inaudible] 
 
311 
00:42:10,040 --> 00:42:19,240 
I mean if it's possible, I mean, again, the Sunni's are not 
homogeneous. You know Anbar's a very tribal region. 
 
312 
00:42:19,240 --> 00:42:29,440 
It may be that the Sunni's actually don't want one single unit. 
Nineveh and Mosul is much less tribal, it's very Arab nationalist, 
 
313 
00:42:29,440 --> 00:42:37,360 
a range of former Baathists, a lot of former Baathists there. Maybe 
they feel themselves to have separate identities, they may not want a 
single unit. 
 
314 
00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:43,280 
The Kurds in Syria actually have in their constitution to have three 
units not one. 
 
315 
00:42:43,280 --> 00:42:53,340 
Well if the ethnic minority wants multiple units, I think it's all the 
better. It's very difficult to do that if a minority group wants to 
preserve its unity, 
 
316 
00:42:53,340 --> 00:43:05,780 
because then if you want to impose divisions on it, you've got to go 
to war against it. We would have had to fight the Kurds in 2005 to 
impose the preferred solution of most political scientists 
 
317 
00:43:05,780 --> 00:43:09,840 
and I don't know who was willing to go to war with the Kurds to do 
this. 
 
318 
00:43:09,840 --> 00:43:19,200 
[inaudible] 
 
319 
00:43:19,200 --> 00:43:24,400 
Well  some of it depends on what circumstance you find yourself in. 
 
320 
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:32,200 
The Kurds you know, in 2005 arguably were the most coherent, powerful, 
single group in Iraq. 
 
321 
00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:43,340 
They had an army, Iraq itself didn't even have an army. So there were 
practical, really severe practical problems to try to impose something 
on the Kurds that they didn't want 
 
322 
00:43:43,340 --> 00:43:53,320 
and most ethnic minority groups who have been fighting twenty years, 
for either independence or autonomy  against an ethnic majority group, 
 
323 
00:43:53,320 --> 00:44:01,260 
by the time they sit around a peace table the ethnic majority group 
says "okay here's what we're going to offer you, we're going to divide 
and conquer you by chopping you up". 
 
324 
00:44:01,260 --> 00:44:08,140 
It just doesn't.. it's not feasible. So when an ethnic minority group 
wants to preserve its coherence and unity. 
 
325 
00:44:08,140 --> 00:44:13,140 
Unless you're prepared to impose a solution on them, then yes that's 
what you have to do. 
 
326 
00:44:13,140 --> 00:44:21,000 
I think it was Nigeria was the example, where they kept dividing up 
into smaller and smaller groups. 
 
327 
00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:21,500 
Yeah. 
 
328 
00:44:21,500 --> 00:44:26,140 
Is there diminishing returns on that kind of a [inaudible]? 
 
329 
00:44:26,140 --> 00:44:38,780 
[laughing] Yeah there is. The way the Nigerians did it, I mean it was 
really the first round of this.. hold on, let me get a map. The first 
round of this... 
 
330 
00:44:38,780 --> 00:44:46,240 
Here, so you start with a three-fold division and I mean I've had to 
deal with this in a very short space of time, but 
 
331 
00:44:46,240 --> 00:44:52,860 
this was seen as a very unstable thing, because you associate each of 
these three regions with it's own ethnic group. 
 
332 
00:44:52,860 --> 00:45:00,680 
Where as the Hausa Fulani are only 30% of the Nigerian population, but 
they were the majority within the Northern region, therefore they 
captured the Northern region 
 
333 
00:45:00,680 --> 00:45:06,700 
and therefore the Northern region was seen as a vehicle for Hausa 
Fulani dominance over the whole of Nigeria. 
 
334 
00:45:06,700 --> 00:45:15,360 
So the first division, that was actually implemented by a military 
dictator, basically. Hausa Fulani didn't want this to happen. 
 
335 
00:45:15,360 --> 00:45:23,060 
The military dictator said "tough, it's happening". And so that was 
designed to break up the large concentrations of ethnic groups 
 
336 
00:45:23,060 --> 00:45:27,580 
and activate sub-ethnic divisions and this sort of thing and it was 
quite effective. 
 
337 
00:45:27,580 --> 00:45:35,360 
Subsequently what they did was actually incentivize smaller bits to 
declare the want to become their own states. 
 
338 
00:45:35,360 --> 00:45:45,740 
For example, some of the revenues from oil,  a certain amount goes to 
you as a state and it's equally divided. 
 
339 
00:45:45,740 --> 00:45:53,180 
So in a sense, it encourages, you know if you're Yoruba you get more 
money if you're ten states rather than two. 
 
340 
00:45:53,180 --> 00:46:03,300 
You get positions in a cabinet allocated on a state basis. So again, 
if you're either Yoruba and you've got two states, 
 
341 
00:46:03,300 --> 00:46:09,340 
you only get two cabinet positions and you get two slices of the pie. 
You subdivide into ten states, you get cabinet positions... 
 
342 
00:46:09,340 --> 00:46:21,520 
So they incentivize you know, subdivisions as it were. At some point I 
think the problem with a place like Nigeria is -- an hour and thirty-
six -- a lot of these states aren't really capable of governing 
themselves. 
 
343 
00:46:21,520 --> 00:46:32,820 
They lack the resources to do it. So that starts to become a problem. 
The smaller and smaller chinks you get, the more difficult is for 
these to govern themselves in any sort of efficient way. 
 
344 
00:46:32,820 --> 00:46:38,340 
So there are drawbacks. December. 
 
345 
00:46:38,340 --> 00:46:47,480 
In the second republic you didn't [inaudible] 
 
346 
00:46:47,480 --> 00:46:57,500 
They went to a presidential system in 2001. And so it's all about 
[inaudible]. 
 
347 
00:46:57,500 --> 00:47:06,100 
Yeah I mean look, I thin I started with this quote. I started with a 
puppy, obviously. Yeah. 
 
348 
00:47:06,100 --> 00:47:15,520 
"Good political institutions make political idiocy more difficult, but 
not impossible to achieve". There's a limit to what you can achieve by 
manipulating political institutions. 
 
349 
00:47:15,520 --> 00:47:26,920 
I think if you read most of the literature. I mean I'm not an expert 
on Nigeria, I know a lot about the federal system of federalism 
 
350 
00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:34,180 
and the people who write about this say " look, if they hadn't done 
this Nigeria was toast. It would not have survived". 
 
351 
00:47:34,180 --> 00:47:42,180 
But the reforms to the federal system and the preservation of the 
federalist system at least, would have helped keep Nigeria together. 
 
352 
00:47:42,180 --> 00:47:48,440 
[inaudible] 
 
353 
00:47:48,440 --> 00:47:55,000 
Yeah I mean, How else would you govern it I guess would be another 
question. 
 
354 
00:47:55,000 --> 00:48:05,200 
I mean there are so many other factors besides the ethnic division of 
[inaudible] 
 
355 
00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:11,620 
Well I only picked... I mean I'm not arguing in favor of Nigeria -- I 
don't know where it's gone now -- I'm only arguing... 
 
356 
00:48:11,620 --> 00:48:21,280 
I only brought it up, because this is the argument that political 
scientists put forward about what to do with Iraq, that this is an 
effective way to do it and whatever. So it's not... 
 
357 
00:48:21,280 --> 00:48:28,800 
My argument doesn't depend on Nigeria being a thumping success. It's 
an illustration of a different approach to drawing lines. 
 
358 
00:48:28,800 --> 00:48:38,320 
So you draw them to divide up ethnic groups rather than around the 
ethnic group. So I'm quite happy to concede that you're absolutely 
right, 
 
359 
00:48:38,320 --> 00:48:45,720 
because this isn't, it's not what I'm in favor of anyway, so not what 
I'm advocating. 
 
360 
00:48:45,720 --> 00:48:54,780 
But it was a Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz who kind of looked at 
this, but feel free to disagree with him. Promod. 
 
361 
00:48:54,780 --> 00:48:57,320 
Yeah, if you can go back to that table 
 
362 
00:48:57,320 --> 00:48:57,880 
The Puppy? 
 
363 
00:48:57,880 --> 00:49:03,060 
[inaudible] 
 
364 
00:49:03,060 --> 00:49:16,920 
Yeah I should say that the success and failure, it's on terms... 
Success and failure are defined by those who have criticized ethnic 
autonomy arrangements. 
 
365 
00:49:16,920 --> 00:49:27,560 
So in other words, it's a failure if the government re-centralized the 
system and eliminated the ethnic autonomy or if the ethnic unit 
seceded from the whole. 
 
366 
00:49:27,560 --> 00:49:32,180 
It's a success if the thing's still together and it hasn't been re-
centralized. 
 
367 
00:49:32,180 --> 00:49:44,160 
[inaudible] What I'm seeing is a lot of or most of these [inaudible]. 
Well, not going to happen. 
 
368 
00:49:44,160 --> 00:49:54,800 
And on the one hand for example, [inaudible] 
 
369 
00:49:54,800 --> 00:50:03,860 
On another hand, the system was deeply simple and you can look at 
India for example, 
 
370 
00:50:03,860 --> 00:50:17,200 
part of the reason why India succeeded was because at the same time 
[inaudible] 
 
371 
00:50:17,200 --> 00:50:21,340 
at the same time democracy [inaudible] 
 
372 
00:50:21,340 --> 00:50:21,840 
Right. 
 
373 
00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:31,300 
And that democracy actually made possible for the different groups, 
differen kinds of [inaudible] 
 
374 
00:50:31,300 --> 00:50:32,160 
Sure. 
 
375 
00:50:32,160 --> 00:50:35,900 
And then also India had [inaudible] 
 
376 
00:50:35,900 --> 00:50:36,400 
Right 
 
377 
00:50:36,400 --> 00:50:37,940 
And that meant... 
 
378 
00:50:37,940 --> 00:50:38,440 
[cough] 
 
379 
00:50:38,440 --> 00:50:47,320 
So what I'm saying there is many democracies are transplants in a 
system of the [inaudible] 
 
380 
00:50:47,320 --> 00:50:54,600 
is a must for any [inaudible] the country [inaudible] 
 
381 
00:50:54,600 --> 00:50:55,260 
Well... 
 
382 
00:50:55,260 --> 00:50:57,060 
[inaudible] 
 
383 
00:50:57,060 --> 00:50:57,560 
I.. I.. 
 
384 
00:50:57,560 --> 00:51:04,040 
Pakistan you have [inaudible]. On the one hand you have the Pakistan 
[inaudible] 
 
385 
00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:04,540 
Right. 
 
386 
00:51:04,540 --> 00:51:08,280 
And then you also have the [inaudible] 
 
387 
00:51:08,280 --> 00:51:08,800 
Right. 
 
388 
00:51:08,800 --> 00:51:17,140 
[inaudible] 
 
389 
00:51:17,140 --> 00:51:27,380 
[inaudible] 
 
390 
00:51:27,380 --> 00:51:35,000 
[inaudible] 
 
391 
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:43,560 
[inaudible] 
 
392 
00:51:43,560 --> 00:51:49,900 
So what I'm saying is that how can we think [inaudible] whether it is 
 
393 
00:51:49,900 --> 00:51:56,640 
how you run the political system in terms of how [inaudible] 
 
394 
00:51:56,640 --> 00:52:02,980 
Well what you do is you run a logistic regression and you control for 
democracy. 
 
395 
00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:10,400 
So that.. I mean, again, my stats guys isn't here, but you forced me 
back to the numbers. 
 
396 
00:52:10,400 --> 00:52:18,020 
I mean you can look at this one way, which is essentially these 
differences in structure matter even after controlling for level of 
democracy. 
 
397 
00:52:18,020 --> 00:52:24,400 
That's what the numbers tell you. So essentially this is one way of 
taking democracy out of it. 
 
398 
00:52:24,400 --> 00:52:28,760 
So you control for democracy, it still matters what structure you 
have. 
 
399 
00:52:28,760 --> 00:52:36,760 
But I think it's more interesting in fact, to think about it in terms 
of what I said, which is that it matters more at certain levels of 
democracy. 
 
400 
00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:44,800 
So I mean again, Pakistan, it may have.. once you have really low 
levels of democracy, you're going to fail, right? Probably. 
 
401 
00:52:44,800 --> 00:52:50,380 
That's what the numbers tell you anyway. Really high levels of 
democracy, you're going to succeed. It doesn't really matter how you 
organize it. 
 
402 
00:52:50,380 --> 00:52:56,860 
You know Finland can adopt whatever system it wants for its Swedish 
speakers and it's probably going to succeed. 
 
403 
00:52:56,860 --> 00:53:07,860 
Where it matters most is somewhere in the middle, which is where we 
happen to find most of the post-conflict environments in which you 
have to start constructing you know, these institutions. 
 
404 
00:53:07,860 --> 00:53:19,920 
So I accept your point, but that numerically or statistically is kind 
of controlled for in this analysis. 
 
405 
00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:24,580 
[inaudible] 
 
406 
00:53:24,580 --> 00:53:25,140 
Where's the beer? 
 
407 
00:53:25,140 --> 00:53:35,240 
This event you come with all this  [inaudible] 
 
408 
00:53:35,240 --> 00:53:44,400 
is going to be more stable. How do you do that without [inaudible] ? 
 
409 
00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:46,400 
Well but... 
 
410 
00:53:46,400 --> 00:53:59,380 
Who is going to do that? How are leaders going to accept that? 
[inaudible] 
 
411 
00:53:59,380 --> 00:54:02,300 
And then we'll have a [inaudible] 
 
412 
00:54:02,300 --> 00:54:11,520 
Well I mean you've got a choice. If you're a Shiia politician like the 
current prime minister, fortunately Maliki is gone now, but Haider al-
Abadi, right? 
 
413 
00:54:11,580 --> 00:54:19,680 
He comes into power, he's seen what happens if you are a sectarian 
leader like Nouri al-Maliki, right? 
 
414 
00:54:19,680 --> 00:54:29,380 
So if he has an interest in preserving the territorial integrity of 
Iraq, then he knows that in the end the Sunnis have to have some sort 
autonomy, 
 
415 
00:54:29,380 --> 00:54:39,440 
some sort of defense against the central government.  He also, if he 
understands that the best way for Iraq to hold together and preserve 
it's territorial integrity, 
 
416 
00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:46,360 
is to leave the south divided up into multiple units, to have a Sunni 
region and a Kurdish region, then he's got a choice. 
 
417 
00:54:46,360 --> 00:54:56,220 
You know, you can either do that and hope that Iraq hold s together or 
not do that and end up fighting against Sunnis and Kurds until the end 
of time. I mean 
 
418 
00:54:56,220 --> 00:55:04,700 
yeah, I can't force them to do it and all political institutions can 
do is make idiocy more difficult, you know? 
 
419 
00:55:04,700 --> 00:55:12,680 
At some point you know, the interests of the political leaders have to 
be towards keeping the thing together. 
 
420 
00:55:12,680 --> 00:55:18,320 
If they don't want to live together then nobody can make them and the 
institutions can't do that, so. I mean it's a fair point, but 
 
421 
00:55:18,320 --> 00:55:27,720 
my job stops short of that. I'm not going to go over to Iraq and 
convince guys to do it, but. 
 
422 
00:55:27,720 --> 00:55:29,420 
Alright lets' give him a hand please 
 
423 
00:55:29,420 --> 00:55:33,940 
[applause] 
 
424 
00:55:33,940 --> 00:55:41,340 
Alright thank you everybody, this was an excellent second CoLA 
Research Conference. I learned a lot [laughing] 
 
425 
00:55:41,340 --> 00:55:48,080 
from everybody and it was really nice seeing Janet's slides, because 
those are my kind of slides. I appreciate them a lot 
 
426 
00:55:48,080 --> 00:55:53,740 
So I just want to make sure, I want to thank Stephanie Dickie for 
organizing everything. Thank you so much Stephanie. 
 
427 
00:55:53,740 --> 00:55:56,860 
[applause] 
 
428 
00:55:56,860 --> 00:56:10,520 
And we also have our reception over here, so make sure everybody comes 
over and has camaraderie and libations and food and thank you so much 
for coming. 
 
 
